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ABSTRACT 
The central theme of this study is to explore the 
growth and causes of a relatively new form of "property 
crime" - the large scale theft of high technology products 
while these products are in transit from the point of 
manufacture to the point of market (retail stores, end 
users). For the purpose of this study, high technology 
products may be defined as computers, computer monitors, 
computer hard drives, microchips and other computer 
peripherals• 
This study presents evidence that the growth of cargo 
theft as measured by dollar loss, particularly since 1990, 
is directly related to the dynamic growth of the high 
technology manufacturing industry in America. Furthermore, 
current law enforcement efforts to combat this problem are 
insufficient, and if future efforts are not undertaken on a 
highly organized nationwide scale, this criminal enterprise 
will flourish and continue to grow. 
Four facets which comprehensively describe and analyze 
the criminal problem of high technology cargo theft are 
examined, chapter by chapter. Chapter I focuses on defining 
what cargo theft is, provides a historical overview of 
cargo theft in the U.S., present current cargo theft dollar 
iii 
loss estimates, examines rising cargo theft trends theft 
problems that owe to the burgeoning growth of high 
technology- product manufacturing in the U.S., and describes 
the modus operandi utilized in committing this crime. It 
will also provide a description of the groups who engage in 
large-scale cargo theft, and report details on the 
"fencing" operations through which the stolen cargo is 
distributee and sold. 
Chapter ,11 examines the growth of the high technology 
product manufacturing industry since the late 1980*s, and 
describes the rising consumer demand for these products as 
measured by the increasing yearly dollar amounts of all 
total high technology products manufactured in the U.S. 
Chapter III presents data that details the rise in 
cargo theft in the past ten years and describes law 
enforcement response to the formation of the criminal 
industry that has developed around the theft of high 
technology products. A review of legislative response to 
the high technology cargo theft problem will also be 
included. 
Chapter IV provides a discussion of the findings and 
conclusions of this study, with suggestions for future 
IV 
 researGh. It includes policy implications and 
recominendations for establishing a framework; for future 
prevention of high technology cargo theft, especially as 
they relate to improved documentation of such theft, 
Chapter y consists of a conclusion that succinctly 
reiterates the problem, its extent, and briefly restates 
the recommendations of this- study. 
The dc:ta utilized in this study has been obtained from 
0.Si Government documents, private industry manufacturing 
statistics, and law enforcement investigative teams that 
specialize in the investigation of cargo thefts. These 
data will demonstrate that a Ainltibillion dollar criminal 
industry has evolved as a result of the rise of high 
technology manufacturing in the U.S. This study also 
shows that while manufa;cturing rates and the rates Of theft 
of high technology products have grown, criminal justice 
system strategies to combat this problem have hot kept 
pace. An outline for improved prevention of this type of 
crime is, herefore, offered. 
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 CHAPTER ONE 
A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF 
CARGO THEFT 
Introduction 
The movement of goods from point of manufacture to 
market in the U.S. is dependent upon the effective 
operation of a smooth flowing commercial cargo 
transportation infrastructure. The primary modes of 
transportation of goods in the U.S. are trucks, airplanes. 
and railroads. For the purposes of this study, the theft of 
these goods while they are within the commercial 
transportstion system is referred to as cargo theft. Large 
scale thefts of goods have hampered the U.S. distribution 
system for many years. 
The first attempt at quantifying the extent of cargo 
theft in the U.S. was initiated in the late 1970's and 
early 1980 s (Publicover, 1999) by the Department of 
Transportation (DOT) Office of Transportation Security 
(OTS). The OTS was established within the DOT for the 
purpose of researching and quantifying the cargo theft 
problem ar.d organizing a government campaign against it. 
The OTS ut.ilized combined industry and government resources 
and staffing, and was given a mandate to work with private 
industry on this serious problem (Badolato, 2000). Until 
the demise of the OTS in 1982, it provided both law 
enforcement and private industry with reports on topics 
related to cargo theft. Unfortunately, no such government 
entity as i:he OTS is in existence today. Perhaps the most 
significant study to emerge from this era, however, was a 
government General Accounting Office (GAO) study 
(Comptroller General of the United States, General 
Accounting Office (GAO), (1980), which identified the 
extent of cargo crime in the United States and evaluated 
the perform,ance of the OTS in examining this crime. The GAO 
study foun that while the OTS had estimated that 1977 
losses due to cargo theft amounted to approximately 1 
billion doliars (adjusted for inflation the GAO figure 
would equal approximately 1.8 billion 1997 dollars), the 
OTS analys s "underestimated the amount of theft-related 
losses" (G.AO, 1980). The GAO attributed the underestimation 
of losses by the OTS to data relying solely on submissions 
only from large cargo carriers, omitting for the most part, 
medium and smaller sized carriers from the study 
(Publicover, 1999). Moreover-^ the GAO study stated that 
indirect casts, such as filing claims, investigations, and 
paying claims on these losses were believed to be two to 
three times the amount of the actual losses, bringing the 
total cost to somewhere between 2 and 5 billion dollars 
(GAO, 1980). Perhaps most important in terms of error, 
however, is the fact that OTS study did not address the 
issue of intentionally underreported or unreported losses. 
Chronic Reporting Problems 
In attempting to gauge any truly representative dollar 
loss figure, as cited in the 1980 GAO study, unreported and 
underreported losses were a major impediment twenty years 
ago and they remain so today. Many cargo carriers, as well 
as manufacturers, are reticent to report theft losses for 
fear that if some losses were made public, customer 
confidence in particular carriers as well as manufacturers 
might be inihibited (Publicover, 1999). The cargo 
transportation industry, therefore, often viewed it as less 
costly to absorb smaller losses and have insurance only 
cover larger loss claims. 
Additional reasons for non-reporting and 
underreporting cited by the GAO study include the fact that 
carriers feared manufacturers might shift business to 
another carrier due to security concerns; carriers wanted 
to limit the ability of competitors to utilize poor 
security records as part of an effort to expand market 
share; carri rs feared that insurance companies would use 
theft statistics to raise rates of coverage; and carriers 
were unable to determine the actual point of loss during 
long or complex movements of cargo, making filing a police 
report impossible. The fact that ho nationwide reporting 
system exists that provides a data base to measure dollar 
loss figures adds to the problem of non-reported and 
underreported losses. Empirical data on cargo theft losses 
is extremely limited since no central repository of 
information exists. Presently, only a very few cargo theft 
task forces collect data on incidents of theft in their 
respective jurisdictions (Toth, 1997). They tend to be 
local or regional, which provides only a sketchy picture of 
the problem. 
Current Cargo Theft Estimates 
From tte time of the demise of the OTS until 
approximately 1995, organized efforts by the Federal 
government oin a nation-wide scale to combat the problem of 
cargo theft, for the most part became a non-issue (Tyska, 
American Trucking Association (ATA) Security Forum, 2000). 
In the early 1990's, however, cargo theft began to rise in 
several areas of the U.S., and one of the nation's first 
multijurisdictional law enforcement cargo theft 
investigative teams, the Los Angeles County Sheriff's 
Department Cargo CATs (Cargo Criminal Apprehension Team) 
was formed t0 address the growing problem of cargo theft in 
Southern California. By the mid 1990's cargo theft began 
rise steeply (Publicover, 1999) and in April of 1996, the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), at the behest of the 
U.S. Departrrent of Justice, held an Interstate Theft and 
Strategic Iritiatives Cargo Theft Conference in Miami, 
Florida (Millar, FBI Symposium, 2000). One of the more 
important aspects of this conference was that the FBI did 
not limit the invited conference attendees to members of 
law enforcement. Private industry and cargo transportation 
representatives were invited to attend and were actively 
solicited for information and participation. In 1997 the 
FBI estimat d that cargo theft totaled 3.5 billion dollars, 
During that same year, the National Cargo Security Council 
(NCSC), a coalition of public and private transportation 
organizatioas, estimated cargo theft nationally at 10 
billion dollars per year. Figure 1 plots the steady 
increase in cargo thefts. 
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Figure 1. Federal Bureau of Investigation and National 
Cargo Security Council Cargo Theft Dollar 
Estimates in Billions - A Twenty-Three 
Year Trend 1977-2000 
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By 1999 the FBI estimated that cargo theft in the 
U.S. amounted to 7 billion dollars per year (Millar, FBI 
Symposium 2000). However, according to the U.S. Department 
of Transportation (Publicover, 1999), the rule of thumb 
used by lavv enforcement in estimating property theft is 
that only 40 percent of businesses or individuals actually 
report the tleft. Based on this percentage, the 1997 FBI 
estimate wouId equate to 8.75 billion dollars in losses for 
the year 1997 and the 1999 FBI estimate of 7 billion 
dollars would equate to 17.5 billion dollars (Publicover, 
1999). This higher dollar figure is more in line with the 
year 2000 U.S. cargo theft figure of 12 billion dollars in 
losses as estimated by the NCSC. The FBI also recognized 
that their estimates do not include losses from many 
smaller cargo transportation companies or cargo stolen in 
geographic I'egions of the U.S. in which the FBI does not 
have cargo-related theft task forces or programs 
(Publicover, 1999). Moreover, the FBI currently concedes 
that domestic losses due to cargo theft may well reach 12 
billion dol ars per year in the year 2000 (Millar, FBI 
Symposium, 000), while the United Nations' International 
Maritime Organization (IMG) places cargo theft losses at 30 
billion dollars per year worldwide (Badolato, 2000). 
According to Tyska (ATA Security Forum, 2000), in 
terms of cargo theft, the period of 1983 through 1990 is 
known as "the lull before the storm." He contends that 
during this period there was no federal focus on cargo 
crime due to increased federal law enforcement attention to 
the "war on drugs," gangs, terrorism and the problem of 
illegal aliens entering the U.S. en masse. Federal 
resources were directed toward these problems, and efforts 
related to cargo theft were greatly reduced. At the same 
time, government and industry combined efforts slowed to 
nearly a hal 
A resurgence of cargo crime began in the 1990's and a 
new breed of cargo thief emerged - high technology cargo 
thieves. Between 1993 and 1998 the FBI estimates that while 
there are no exact statistics available, there was at least 
a 600% increase in cargo theft dollar losses (DeSarno, FBI 
Symposium, 2000). This is attributed to the enormous amount 
of high-value, high technology products that began being 
stolen while in transit. Thieves realized, as the Rand 
Study (Dertouzos, Larson, and Ebener, 1999) pointed out, "a 
suitcase of microprocessors is worth more than the 
equivalent amount of cocaine, is more difficult to trace, 
and is not a felony to have in one's possession" (p.2). It 
may also be observed that legal penalties involved in theft 
of high tecinology products pale in comparison to those for 
drug-related crimes (McKay, 2000). 
High Technology Cargo Theft 
Modus Operandi 
The weakest link in the transportation supply chain of 
high technology product shipments lies in the trucking 
industry. Trucks may be the target of robberies in several 
ways. Organized criminal groups come to learn which 
products leave from particular loading docks at 
manufacturing sites. They observe the freight or use paid 
informants. When they note a truck leaving a targeted dock 
they notify fellow thieves who then follow the truck, many 
times in a "Van. They then accost and sometimes kidnap the 
driver, and hijack the load of high technology cargo that 
can amount one half million dollars of high technology 
product in one truckload. 
Other times, they may follow the truck, wait for the 
driver to stop to eat or make a telephone call, and then 
break into the rear door of the trailer and remove 
$100,000 to $200,000 worth of high technology product 
within a few minutes. Some individuals who commit these 
crimes are rjell armed and will not hesitate to kill a 
driver who attempts to thwart their efforts (L.A. Times, 
10/12/93). The trucking industry is the most frequently 
victimized mode of cargo transport by high technology cargo 
 thieves as 85% of all cargo transported in the U.S. is 
moved by truck, according to the U.S. Seaport Commission's 
2000 report (U.S. Secretary of Transportation, 2000). 
Railroad containers have also been targeted for theft, as 
well as load of high technology freight being transported 
by air (Ohlhausen, 1997) 
Who Engages in Cargo Theft? 
The orgahized groups who steal cargo professionally 
have come to be known to law enforcement as "crews" 
(Steinhauser, 2000). Many of those who are members of the 
substantially large crews have immigrated into the United 
States from Ecuador, Peru, Columbia and other countries 
specifically for the purpose of engaging in high technology 
cargo theft (Ohlhausen, 1997). Vietnamese gangs have 
specialized in armed takeovers of high technology 
manufacturirg sites in Southern and Northern California 
(France and Burrows,1997). It is exceedingly difficult for 
law enforcement to place undercover operatives into these 
organizations due to the close-knit nature of these 
immigrant groups. 
These crews are often aided in their illegal 
activities by obtaining "inside information." Specific 
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information can be obtained by thieves on what products 
being shippeci, what their value is, when they will be 
shipped, and what cargo transport company will be carrying 
them, by placing their associates in jobs at manufacturing 
facilities. Even a dockworker or office clerk can gain 
access to shipping information that can set up a major 
theft. In fa :t, one law enforcement cargo theft team 
estimates that 80% of the high value, high technology 
truckload th fts that they are currently investigating 
involve complicity between the truck drivers and the 
thieves (Morales, 2000). 
A Cargo Theft Crew Profile 
As previously stated, many of the organized 
professional cargo theft groups known as crews have 
immigrated t.o the United States from various countries 
across the world. Cuban crews are based in Florida and 
conduct thed.r theft activities primarily throughout the 
Southeastern United States (Morales, 2000), Per the FBI 
(Internal Memo, 2000), Southern California plays host to 
three ethnic groups that account for the majority of cargo 
theft in the region. They are, in order of activity, 
Hispanic (primarily Ecuadorian), African-American (mainly 
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older Crip and Blood street gang members who have graduated 
from traditional gang activity to cargo theft), and Asian 
(mostly young Vietnamese gang members, almost exclusively 
engaging in high technology product thefts). 
The foremost ethnically based crew in Southern 
California engaging in cargo theft, particularly high 
technology product theft, consists of Ecuadorian nationals 
(Choo, 2001). While the Ecuadorian group is by no means the 
only organized cargo theft group in operation in Southern 
California, their activity, which is believed to have 
commenced in the early 1990's, has been prodigious. Choo 
(2001) states that law enforcement has identified a network 
of over 300 Ecuadorian nationals, many in this country 
illegally, as cargo theft crew members. Jefcoat (2001), 
disputes this figure and states that the Ecuadorian 
organization must be viewed in it's totality, i.e., not 
only focusing on the number of identified crew members who 
actually perform thefts, but also broadening the scope to 
include those who finance the organization, and those who 
store, fence, and distribute the stolen cargo. Jefcoat 
contends that the Ecuadorian organization is over 3,000 
individuals. These individuals are located in New York, 
Florida, and San Jose, CA. However, both Choo and Jefcoat 
12 
 agree that Los Angeles appears to be their center of 
operations and home to the hierarchy of the organization. 
Known Ecuadorian crew members have been found to range 
in age from 18 to 65 years, with the notable exception of 
an 86 year^old Ecuadorian arrested recently in San Jose, 
CA., who occupied a "minor" position in their organization. 
While the organization is comprised primarily Of males, 
females, too, perform functions such as drivers of 
"spotter" or "chase" vehicles that are used to run 
interference with law enforcement in the event of a pursuit 
following a theft. Female members are also used to rent 
vehicles used in thefts. It has been determined that many 
of the male Ecuadorian crew members have military and/or 
police backgrounds in their native country (Jefcoat, 2001). 
It is belie Aed that this fact accounts for their highly 
skilled ade]stness in counter-surveillance techniques, which 
have many times compromised law enforcement surveillance of 
the group. It has also been noted that they appear to be 
very familiar with the capabilities of different video 
camera systems employed by high technology manufacturing 
facilities in the monitoring of activity around facility 
perimeters. and have avoided, for the most part, being 
13 
 identified by video systems by staying out of range of the 
cameras. 
As stated, Choo (2001), believes that over 300 
individuals lave been identified as being part of this 
Ecuadorian cargo theft group throughout the U.S. The 
members of this group are highly mobile and frequently 
rotate from Florida to San Jose to New York and to Los 
Angeles. The leader of the group dispatches individuals to 
the separate "cells" of the organization throughout the 
country. The leader is also known to have, at times, taken 
"orders" for specific types of high technology products 
from potential buyers and then ordered crews to "shop" 
various manufacturing and shipping locations throughout the 
country in an effort to locate and steal large quantities 
of the desired product(Choo, 2001). At other times thefts 
occur without prior knowledge of exactly what produch is 
stolen, only knowing that the theft will involve some type 
of high technology product. When the product is stolen, it 
is quickly distributed to "fences," many times within only 
a few hours. These crews demonstrate an almost admirable 
"work ethic" in that they generally engage in some form of 
surveillance or search for some form of potential product 
to steal on at least a five day per week basis (Zavala, 
14 
2001). Over the last decade these crews have evolved in 
terms of their tactics. During the early 1990's, they were 
using their own personal vehicles for surveillance activity 
and thefts. By 1995-1996 most crews began utilizing rental 
vehicles, generally favoring the usage of vans, SUV's, and 
occasionally large sedans for their activities. Many times, 
just prior to the commission of a theft, they will place 
paper bags over the license plates of their vehicle, 
although it recently has been noted that they are 
apparently applying false paper license plates over the 
legitimate plates, and easily remove the paper plates after 
a theft. 
In terms of surveillance activity, many of the males 
wear work-type garb, giving them the appearance of 
construction workers, mechanics, or delivery drivers. This 
allows them to,casually walk around the area of potential 
targets without raising suspicion as to who they are and 
what they are doing in the area. The crews will perform 
surveillance of high technology manufacturing and shipping 
sites and learn shipping patterns and volumes of shipments, 
Truck drivers picking up high technology freight from 
manufacturing sites are followed, generally by two 
vehicles, the first vehicle being the theft vehicle. 
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usually a van or SUV with middle seat removed for stolen 
product storcige, and the second vehicle being a "spotter' 
or "chase" vehicle. In cases where suspects have been 
apprehended, only the drivers of the vehicles carry 
identification. The other passengers carry no 
identification, and claim to be unable to speak English, 
They invariably tell Spanish translators that they know 
nothing of any thefts and are riding around looking for 
work. In one such arrest, during a law enforcement search 
of the vehicle involved, a large address book was found 
with over 200 handwritten names and addresses of computer 
manufacturers and distributors, primarily throughout the 
State of California, but also containing addresses in 
Texas, New Jersey, Illinois, Idaho and North Dakota. A note 
in Spanish was also found in the address book describing a 
zircon timer for a bomb, which it is theorized, the crew 
may have had an "order" to steal (Jefcoat, 2000). 
When a crew spots a suitable target truck that they 
know is carrying high technology freight, they will follow 
the vehicle;, sometimes throughout the entire day (the 
favored time to strike is between 1500-1900 hours, when 
traffic congestion slows police response time and hampers 
pursuits), until the driver stops to take a break, makes a 
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telephone cal1, or leaves his or her vehicle unattended 
while making another delivery. At that point, the entire 
"rig" may be stolen or the crew will break into the rear 
door of the freight trailer and quickly remove as much high 
technology freight as is possible before being spotted. 
It is of interest to note that while incidents of 
violence have occurred during the commission of thefts 
involving other ethnic groups, in most scenarios the 
Ecuadorian thieves intentionally avoid engaging in physical 
confrontaticns. When the lookout alerts those in the 
process of removing freight from a trailer that they have 
beeh "made" in the act of theft, the thieves immediately 
drop what they are carrying and flee without threat or 
confrontation. Typically, the driver of the theft vehicle 
never leaves his position behind the steering wheel and a 
lookout in the second car is in constant cell phone or two-
way radio communication with the driver. While other 
passengers from the first vehicle perform the theft. The 
timing and execution exhibited during the course of the 
robberies is near perfect and the robberies are clearly 
well planned. As mentioned, violence is eschewed. It is 
believed that the Ecuadorian crews are aware of law 
enforcemenl policies and procedures, as well as the laws of 
17 
 the U.S., and they realize that if their activities turn 
violent that considerable pressure from law enforcement 
would result, and that violent crimes carry much heavier 
penalties than unarmed theft. 
In terms of arrest and prosecution of the Ecuadorian 
crews, Choo states that since June of 1998 through January 
of 2001, only five crews have been arrested nationwide and 
that within approximately one week of each set of arrests, 
the crew hac been replenished with other Ecuadorians, 
Furthermore, thus far law enforcement has not been able to 
place even one undercover operative into an Ecuadorian 
crew. Choo cites two reasons for this. First, the tightly 
knit Ecuadorian cultural background will not permit any 
"outsiders,^' even other Central and South American 
immigrants into the crews. Secondly, the backgrounds of 
crew members are closely examined to ascertain the identity 
of any relatives who still reside in Ecuador. Should a crew 
member ever cooperate with American law enforcement, the 
relatives in Ecuador would be the target for reprisal. 
On occasions when Ecuadorian crew members are 
arrested, they invariably insist to law enforcement and to 
the INS that they are Mexican nationals and demand to be 
sent to Mexico. Once sent to Mexico, they quickly return to 
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the U.S. and resume their criminal activities. One tactic 
recently developed is.to question those arrested in the 
presence of :he INS to describe the Mexican flag, name the 
President of Mexico, or answer other questions that. 
presumably a Mexican national would know at least some of 
the answers to. The Ecuadorians apparently have not been 
coached on such subjects and often failed to answer such 
questions correctly. Law enforcement believes that once 
deported back to Ecuador, some of these individuals may 
have been killed for their "failure" (Choo, 2001). 
Law enforcement has also noted that when Ecuadorian 
crew members who have been arrested in cargo thefts are 
brought to trial, that other Ecuadorians, primarily 
females, are sent to attend the trials and report back to 
the leadership of the organization as to what transpired in 
Court and what the defendants stated. Recently, two female 
crew members were observed leaving Los Angeles via airplane 
to attend a trial in San Jose and then were observed 
immediately flying back to Los Angeles at the conclusion of 
the trial. presumably to report on what had occurred during 
the trial. 
As fai" as convictions, when crew members are caught, 
they generally "plead out" and with no proven criminal 
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history in tle U.S. they are sentenced to probation and/or 
time served ^ith a fine, which is promptly paid by the 
' 
Ecuadorian organization. 
Law enforcement has also noted that Ecuadorian crew 
members have been so bold as to enter "cop bars" where 
Hispanic officers are known to congregate when off duty. It 
is believed that the purpose in this activity is to 
identify potential Hispanic law enforcement undercover 
operatives (Choo,2001). 
Law enforcement has also identified certain bars, 
parks and locations of soccer matches where Ecuadorian crew 
members congregate. Lookouts are generally posted at 
gatherings, many times cruising the area on bicycles 
looking for police. In several instances the lookouts have 
been able to compromise law enforcement surveillance 
activity (Choo,2001). 
As stated by Choo, "the scope of the Ecuadorian crew 
organization is so enormous that no one law enforcement 
agency can handle it - a nationwide task force is needed." 
He sees a lack of communication and inter-agency 
cooperation as major impediments to combating the 
Ecuadorian crews. Choo summarized the problem succinctly by 
stating "without communication everyone (individual law 
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enforcement agencies) is an island, and islands are 
sinking..." 
The Fencing of Stolen High 
Technology Freight 
The sales pipeline of stolen high technology freight 
extends itself on a worldwide basis. The FBI reports that 
the fencing of stolen high technology cargo has gone from 
being an interstate problem to one of international scope. 
Stolen loads of high technology freight have been traced to 
countries bordering the U.S. such as Mexico and Canada and 
also to more adversarial countries such as Jordan, Iran and 
Iraq (Millar, ATA Forum, 2000). Other thefts have occurred 
where stolen high technology products have been found in 
countries such as Ireland and Australia within 72 hours of 
their being stolen in the U.S. (Ohlhausen, 1997). Of note 
is the fact that thieves can get a high price on stolen 
high technology product- up to 50% or more of the market 
value of trie product as opposed to the more common 10% on 
other stolen goods (Ohlhausen, 1997). This fact, coupled 
with the existence of a plethora of both "black market" and 
"grey market" buyers of stolen goods, insures that quick 
and profitable turnover of stolen high technology products 
can be accomplished. 
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While illegal "black market" fences knowingly buy and 
sell stolen goods, "grey market" fences are legitimate 
businesses that also deal in the buying and selling of 
stolen high technology products along with legally obtained 
products of the same nature (Steffensmeir, 1986). Due to 
their appearance of legitimacy, they are difficult to 
identify. 
In addition to the problem of identifying fences, many 
high technology products are not traceable due to 
manufacturers not recording the serial numbers for their 
products until the product has been sold on;the market and 
buyers send in warrantee cards citing the serial number on 
the products. The FBI (Internal Memo, 2000) states that 
similar to cargo theft crews, many fencing operations can 
be categorized along ethnic lines, with the multi-national 
nature of these fencing networks aiding in the" 
international distribution of stolen goods. Large-scale 
Middle Eastern, Asian, Israeli, Hispanic, Russian and 
Armenian fencing operations exist both in Southern 
California and nationally. 
Lastly, while fences fuel the thefts of high 
technology products by organized crews of cargo thieves, 
the fences themselves are fueled by the ever increasing 
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wor:ldwide consumer demand for high technology products. The 
continued grbwth of the high technology industry, driven by 
technologies1 advances and the subsequent development of 
new products then becomes the point of origin in the cycle 
of high technology theft. Therefore, an examination of the 
past, presert, and future predicted growth of the high 
technology manufacturing industry is in order. 
23 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE GROWTH OF THE HIGH 
TECHNOLOGY MANUFACTURING 
INDUSTRY 
Introduction 
The high technology product manufacturing industry is 
one of the most dynamic industries in the United States and 
the world. This industry has grown to be a major 
contributor to the American economic engine (Mandel, 1997) 
and it is still growing at a rapid pace. For the purposes 
of this study, the term "high technology manufacturing" 
encompasses the production of computers, computer 
components, and computer peripherals manufactured within 
the United States. Computers are defined as any electronic 
machinery or equipment which incorporates a central 
processing unit (CPU) for the purpose of performing 
functions such as measuring, displaying and calculating. 
The term "computers" includes devices known as 
supercomputers, mainframe devices, minicomputers, 
microcomputers (or personal computers known as PC's), 
workstations and laptop computers. Computer peripheral 
equipment includes miscellaneous computer accessories which 
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 support the activities of the computer's CPU including, but 
not limited to, printers, optical scanners, graphic 
displays known as monitors, and input devices such as 
keyboards, mice, joysticks, and virtual headsets (Hell and 
Peck, 1998). 
History and Overview 
In order to gain an appreciation of the scope of the 
economic impact that the U.S. high technology manufacturing 
industry has had both nationally and internationally, a 
brief history and overview is in order. 
While mechanical Calculating devices were first 
developed in Europe during the seventeenth century, the 
first real progress in development came in the nineteenth 
century when Charles Babbage designed the Analytical 
Engine, which was the first digital computer (Hell and 
Peck, 1998). Though never actually built, the design served 
as a template for future research and development. 
Relatively little progress occurred until the 1940's when a 
few computers were built. These machines could produce 
tables of complex mathematical functions, The first general 
purpose electronic computer, however, was developed in 
1946, and termed the ENIAC, or electronic numerical 
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integrator and calculator. By the early 1950's more 
powerful and flexible electronic computers such as the 
UNIVAC systeb was developed for the U.S. Bureau of Census. 
During the 1960's "timesharing" systems were developed, 
allowing public and private entities access to large, 
complex mainframe computers. In 1965, the first 
minicomputer was built, and in 1971 the microprocessor was 
developed, which allowed the entire central processor of a 
computer to be placed on a silicon chip, this development, 
200 years in the making, led to the transformation of the 
computer manufacturing industry. 
By the early 1980s, over 500,000 general purpose 
personal computers were in use in North America, and the 
computer market was growing at a rate of 20% per year. 
Technological innovations in the mid 1980s allowed for the 
eventual widespread usage of personal computers and 
workstations. In the 1980s, the number of computers in use 
was 500,OOCi. This number Climbed to over seven million in 
1984 and to 10 million by 1989 (Heil and Peck, 1998). The 
"cyber revolution" had arrived into the offices and homes 
of America 
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High Technology Industry 
Growth 
As seen by the growth profile provided in Table 1 , the 
high technology industry showed almost continuous growth 
from the late 1980's through the 1990's. 
Table 1, 
Year 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
United States Census Bureau - Manufacturing 
Profile of Electronic Computer Shipments 
1987-1998 (Dollar Figures in Billions) 
Computers 
23,212.6 
23.787.4 
25,076.9 
25,630.1 
26.274.1 
28.571.2 
29.659.1 
38.132.2 
49.038.1 
50.681.5 
50,249.9 
57.347.2 
Peripherals 
7,695.7 
7.385.0 
8.271.1 
7,696.6 
7,763.6 
8,505.6 
9.810.2 
10,412.2 
12,331.0 
11,462.8 
13,555.2 
11,449.7 
Total Value 
30.908.3 
31.172.4 
33.348.0 
33,326.7 
34.037.7 
37.076.8 
39.469.3 
48.544.4 
61.369.1 
62,144.3 
63,805.1 
68.796.9 
Examination of the above table shows that between the 
period of 1987 through 1998, the manufacturing of high 
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technology products more than doubled, from $30,908.3 
billion in 1987 to $6:8,796.9 billion in 19981 Moreover, a 
constant fise was demonstrated yearly, with the exception 
of the year 1990, during which production dropped very 
slightly (U.S. Census Bureau, 2000). Figure 3 graphically 
demonstrates this growth curve via a bar graph. 
Figure 2. Graph- United States Census Bureau Manufacturing 
Profile of Electronic Computer Shipments 
1^87-1998(Dollar Figures in Billions) 
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These figures take on even greater importance considering 
that by 1999 the U.S. high technology mahufacturing 
industry controlled 76% of the world market for 
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supercomputers, 60% for mainframe computers, 61% for mid-
range computers and 67% for desktop computers. The U.S. 
also dominated the global computer peripheral market, 
holding a 60% share. In hard disk drives alone, six ,0.3. 
suppliers held an 87% share (Barty, 1998). 
High Technology Industry 
Future Growth Projections 
While high technology, like any other industry, is 
subject to change in market conditions and the effects of 
national arld international recessionary economic 
conditions. the U.S. high technology industry is 
nevertheless expected to continue on a growth pattern well 
into the 21®^ century. Barry (1998), speculates that by the 
end of 2002, product shipments from the U.S. based computer 
equipment industry will increase to reach $170 billion, 
with exports alone totaling $79 billion. According to Heil 
and Peck (1998) several contributing factors are involved 
in the continued growth of this industry. They include: 
1) Sa es will be fueled by lower costs in the 
manufacturing of computer components and the 
resulting lower costs for end products. Consumers 
and businesses do not hesitate to replace only 
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slightly outdated computers and peripherals with new 
state-of-the-art models. 
2) Technological advances will continue, such as 
"multimedia technology," or the incorporation of 
detailed graphics, sound, animation, and video into 
a computer program. In order to fully support such 
complex software, faster and more powerful computers 
will be needed by owners who want to upgrade their 
systems. 
3) The global business and government market is 
expected to provide for more sales opportunities as 
emerging economies demand more high technology 
equipment. At the same time, tariffs on the imports 
of computers are expected to be reduced. As 
economies mature, industrial and government 
infrastructures will need to be modernized. 
4) As emerging economies mature, the foreign home 
computer market will grow substantially. Markets of 
Internet-hungry consumers in Eastern Europe, Central 
and South America, Asia, and the Pacific rim have 
not: yet been tapped. Rising living conditions in 
these markets are expected to fuel sales for years 
to come. 
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5) Nationally, the growth of the Internet continues to 
promote growth in the high technology manufacturing 
industry. In 1996 10 million U.S. homes and 44,000 
U.S. businesses were connected to the Internet. By 
the end of 2000, 33 million homes of the estimated 
100 million homes in America, and 363,000 businesses 
were expected to be connected to the Internet 
(Barry,1998). 
Lastly!, examination of the above cited data and 
information gives all indications that the worldwide "cyber 
revolution" is not likely to go the way of the "hula-hoop." 
High technology products seem destined to influence not 
only how we learn, but also what we learn and what we do 
with our knowledge. The influence of high technology will 
be felt in what we buy, wear, eat and even think. The 
United States is now at the forefront in the development 
and the manufacturing of high technology products. However, 
a serious menace to this industry exists in the form of 
organized groups of large scale high technology product 
thieves. The following section of this study examines law 
enforcement and legislative efforts that have been made 
thus far to combat this multibillion dollar criminal 
menace. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE RISE IN CARGO THEFT AND 
LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE 
Introduction 
As previously noted, the early 1990s witnessed an 
upsurge in cargo theft came about in several major 
metropolitan areas across the United States. Ferguson 
(2001) states that this upsurge was due in large part to 
the nationwide introduction of large volume shipments of 
high technology products not on the market in the 1980s, 
Then shipments became attractive and profitable targets for 
cargo thieves. In response to this alarming trend, law 
enforcement teams with small staffs, specializing in cargo 
theft investigation began to be formed at various locations 
across the country, some of them multi-jurisdictional in 
nature. Unfortunately, to date there is no source of 
systematic data collection in the area of cargo theft that 
summarizes losses across jurisdictions. 
Several of these units provided data on cargo theft 
losses. While this data is by no means complete, it is the 
best available information assembled on the subject and 
performs the function of supporting the assertion that 
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cargo theft in general across the U.S. has risen to 
alarming Iba;els, and it supports the position that high 
technology product cargo theft accounts for a major portion 
of the dollar value related to reported cargo theft. 
This Study relies on data from cargo thefts reported 
to several cargo theft-specific law enforcement teams, 
including the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Cargo Criminal 
Apprehension Team (Cargo CATs), the New Jersey State Police 
Cargo Theft and Robbery Unit, the San Francisco/San Mateo 
Cargo Task Force, the South Florida Tactical Operations 
Multi-Agency Cargo Anti-Theft Squad (TOMCATS), the 
California Highway Patrol Northern Division Cargo Theft 
Interdiction Program (C-TIPS), and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation Interstate/Cargo Theft Squad (Long Beach, CA. 
Resident Agency). 
While data from several law enforcement agencies are 
cited in this study, no law enforcement agency or private 
sector organization other than the Los Angeles County 
Sheriff's Cargo CATs Team was able to supply historic data 
specific to high technology cargo theft. The Los Angeles 
County Sheriff's Cargo CATs Team has archival data going 
back as far as 1991. While much of the data supplied for 
this study by the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Cargo CATs 
33 
Unit (LeBlarc, 2000) were existing data, additional data on 
high teGhnojogy theft were compiled on request specifically 
for this study. 
The Cairgo CATS Unit, founded in 1990, is the oldest 
cargo)offense specific law enforcement team existing in the 
U.S. Data from the second oldest cargo offense specific 
team, the New Jersey State Police Cargo Theft and Robbery 
Unit, are also included in the study. Unfortunately, New 
Jersey State Police Cargo Theft and Robbery Unit data does 
not isolate high technology theft from the theft of other 
products. Therefore, for the purposes of this study, losses 
reported to the Cargo CATs Team are thought to be 
representative of most major metropolitan areas of the U.S. 
in terms of the reported occurrence of high technology 
cargo theft The data that they have supplied the most 
extensive a!nd reliable data on cargo theft available at 
this time, Additional cargo theft related data cited in 
this Study has also been garnered via utilization of 
interviews and word of mouth technique. 
The Extent of Reported 
Cargo Theft 
The Lpis Angeles County Sheriff's Cargo CATs team is a 
multi^jurisdictional unit consisting of personnel from the 
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Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department, the California 
Highway Patrol, Los Angeles Port Police, Vernon Police 
Department, Ontario Police Department, and has also had 
members from the Irvine Police Department as well as the 
F.B.I, attached to the team at various points during it's 
eleven year history. Table 2 provides a summary of the 
growth of cargo theft as reported to the Los Angeles County 
Sheriff's Cargo CATs team during the period of 1992 to 
2000. 
Table 2. LOS Angeles County Sheriff's Cargo Criminal 
Apprehension Team Reported Cargo Thefts 
Losses Reported in Millions) 
Reported Losses 
'90 
'91 
•92 
'93 
'94 
'95 
'96 
'97 
'98 
'99 
NO RE=cORD 
NO RECORD 
$67,181,239 
$96,895,833 
$67,181,239 
$70,373,874 
$65,778,154 
$68,717,404 
$58,109,425 
$62,634,134 
Incidents High Tech Loss/% of all Losses 
494 
625 
486 
427 
363 
453 
337 
384 
N/A 
N/A 
$15,297,086 
$15,886,540 
$21,013,214 
$14,996,507 
$16,051,968 
$13,415,225 
N/A 
N/A 
22.76% 
22.57% 
31.95% 
21.77% 
27.62% 
21.42% 
'00 $56,183,939 436 $17,917,000 31.89% 
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The Los Angeles County Sheriff's Cargo CATs team data 
reveals no Specific upward dollar figure rise during the 
1992 to 2000 period other than a $29 million dollar spike 
in 1993. It should be noted that computers and other high 
technology electronics products comprised little or no 
percentage of reported cargo thefts prior to the electronic 
"technology revolution" that began in the early 1990s 
(Ferguson, 1^001). It is of note, however, that by 1994 
these types of thefts grew to comprise 22.76% of all cargo 
thefts reported to the Cargo CATs team. The 1994-2000 
yearly percentage of high technology and electronics theft 
remained relatively constant except for 1996 when it rose 
to 31.95% and 2000 when it accounted for 31.89%. The most 
interesting statistic to emerge from examination of the 
data is that in terms of long-term reported high technology 
losses sustained during the five year period of 1996-2000, 
high technology thefts translate to an average of 
$16,678,782 per year, or $45,695.29 per day in the Los 
Angeles County area. Keeping in mind the seriousness of the^ 
[ 
problem of gross underreporting and non-reporting of cargo 
theft loss5es as previously cited, and the fact that the 
percentage of high technology cargo theft shows no sign of 
dipping downward, it may be inferred that the theft of high 
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 technology cargo theft exists on a vast scale in Los 
Angeles County and in Southern California. 
The New Jersey State Police Cargo Theft and Robbery 
Unit also supplied yearly totals of cargo theft for this 
study that cover the years of 1991 through 1999 (Lake, 
2000). Unfortunately, no breakdown by product type is 
available, therefore no isolated data on high technology 
cargo theft can be examined. Table 3 provides an overview 
of cargo thiefts reported to the New Jersey State Police 
Cargo Theftj and Robbery Unit during the 1991-1999 period. 
Table 3. ew Jersey State Police Reported Cargo Thefts 
1991-1999 (Losses Reported in Millions) 
Year Total Reported Losses 
'91 $ 392,201 
•92 $ 8,243,997 
'93 $10,686,446 
'94 $13,537,548 
'95 $30,878,291 
'96 $29,302,057 
'97 $18,406,798 
'98 $23,700,431 
'99 $11,764,793 
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not want to show that they have a problem^ with theft 
(Salzmann, 2000). For this reason, it is believed that the 
data provided grossly underestimates cargo theft activity 
in the State of New Jersey. 
The recently formed (1998) San Francisco/San Mateo 
Cargo Theft Task Force is a multi-jursidictional unit 
consisting of the San Francisco Police Department, San 
Mateo County Sherj-ff's Department, South San Francisco 
Police Depa.rtment, Brisbane Police Department and the 
F.B.I. This unit operates primarily in the San Francisco 
International Airport area and focuses primarily on the, 
theft of high technology cargo in transit. Table 4 shows 
the cargo theft losses reported to the unit during 1998 and 
1999. 
Table 4. ^an Francisco/San Mateo Cargo Theft Task Force 
Cargo Theft Losses (Reported in Millions) 
Year Total Reported Losses Incidents Recoveries 
1998 $ 9,722,039 71 $ 4,377,195 
1999 $ 5,309,416 92 $ 2,590,382 
An examination of the data supplied by the San 
Francisco/San Mateo Cargo Theft Task Force reveals that in 
1998 the task force encountered reported losses of 
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$9,782,039 and recovered $4,377,195 worth of stolen product 
for a recovery rate of 44.75%, while in 1995 they cite00 
reported losses as totaling $5,309,416 and recovered 
$2,590,382 worth of stolen product for a recovery rate of 
48.79%. This is an extremely high rate of recovery for 
high technology products. 
The Scuth Florida TOMCATS (Tactical Operation Multi-
Agency Carc'o Anti-Theft Squad) was founded in 1996 and 
consists of personnel for the Metro-Dade Police Department, 
the F.B.I., Broward County Sheriff's Office, U.S. Customs, 
Florida Highway Patrol, and the U.S. Department of 
Transportation. Table 5 provides a summary of cargo theft 
losses reported to the TOMCATS team during the 1996-2000 
period. 
Table 5. 
o 
South Florida Tactical Agency Cargo Anti-Theft 
o Squad Reported Cargo Theft Losses 
(Reported in Millions) 
Reported Losses Incidents Stolen Cargo Recoveries 
(Metro-Dade Area Only) (in Southeastern U.S. 
'96 $ 9,200,000 41 $ 9,975,643 
'97 $ 100,000 32 $16,869,332 
$ 7,200,000 39 $19,612,940 
'99 $ 3,700,000 9 $24,149,474 
$ 1,600,000(January-October,2000) $19,539,143 
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Examination of data indicates that reported cargo 
thefts have steadily decreased in the Metro-Dade area since 
1996. The data do not indicate that the individuals who 
engage in cargo theft in South Florida have ceased 
activity. It is believed that as TOMCAT "sting" operations 
increased, the organized groups of criminals involved in 
cargo theft in that area, generally Cuban immigrant 
"crews," have simply expanded their operations outside of 
the Metro-Dade area to from a theft network that extends as 
far West as San Antonio, Texas, and as far Northeast as 
North Carolina and Virginia, where several high technology 
manufacturing facilities and warehouses are located 
(Keller, 2001)• 
Morton (2001), reports that Cuban crews have recently 
moved carg D theft operations into areas around Knoxville, 
Memphis, aid Nashville, Tennessee as well as in the 
Charlotte, North Carolina area. These crews have modified 
their strategy in the transportation of stolen high 
technology cargo. Previously, they would take their stolen 
goods to the Port of Miami for export to foreign ports, 
Rather than transport stolen cargo across state lines into 
Florida in stolen vehicles, they have developed two new 
methods of transporting stolen cargo. First, the crew rents 
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a warehouse for the offloading and storagd of stolen 
shipments and then rents an empty trailer/container from a 
legitimate transport business to be dropped at a nearby lot 
or building. They then bring the trailer/container to the 
rented warehouse and load it with stolen cargo and take it 
back to the lot or building. The crew manufactures false 
paperwork such as a bill of lading and purchase order using 
the names of "dummy" companies as the shipper and 
consignee. The crew then contacts the legitimate 
trailer/container rental company and arranges for the 
transport of the stolen load to a rail yard to be shipped 
via rail to Florida, or sometimes Georgia, to subsequently 
be exported outside of the U.S. 
The second option of transport also involves the crew 
maintaining a warehouse operation for stolen shipments of 
cargo to be offloaded and stored. After offloading the 
stolen load and disposing of the stolen vehicle that 
contained the load, the crew contacts a legitimate trucking 
company tc pick up the stolen load for transport to Florida 
or Georgia. Once again, dummy companies and falsified 
paperwork are utilized. The crew pays the legitimate 
carrier to truck the stolen product to designated locations 
in Florid^ or Georgia for export (Morton, 2001). 
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In both of the above scenarios, while the crew covers 
the cost of legitimate trailer/container rental and 
transport, the chances of being caught violating federal 
laws involving the interstate transport of stolen goods 
lessen greatly. Consequently, Florida, and particularly the 
Miami Metro-Dade area, has become an epicenter for the 
international movement of stolen cargo out of the U.S. 
(Morales, 2000). At the same time, in the Northeast area of 
the U.S., Sheets; (1996), states that Ecuadorian crews are 
conducting their theft activities along a corridor 
stretching from Vermont to Kentucky. Heil (2001) reports 
increased theft activity from Peruvian crews based in New 
York, who too, have extended their area of operations down 
the eastern seaboard as far south as Virginia. The Peruvian 
crews, like the Cubans, observe high technology 
manufacturing sites, follow truck drivers to truck stops 
after load3 of high technology product have been picked up, 
and then steal the loads from truck stop parking lots while 
the drivers eat, use the telephohe, shower, etc. The loads 
of high technology products that are stolen in these areas 
by Peruvians are many times transported to South Florida to 
be shipped out of the Port of Miami to foreign destinations 
(Emmes, 2001). 
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This is reflected in the fact that while TOMCATS 
reported thefts have steadily declined, their recovery 
rates of stolen cargo have escalated. Since 1996, the 
TOMCATS have recovered up to eight or nine times the amount 
of cargo thlat has been reported stolen in the Metro-Dade 
area. 
The California Highway Patrol Northern Division C-TIPS 
(Cargo Theft Interdiction Program) unit supplied the data 
contained d n Table 6 (Leonard, 2000). 
Table 6. California Highway Patrol Cargo Theft 
Interdiction Program Reported Cargo Thefts 
(Dollar Figures in Millions) 
Losses Computer Losses % Other High Tech % 
'98 $40,418,169 $12,111,118 16.87% $11,010,596 8.28% 
'99 $ 8,647,961 $ 2,676,749 47.62% $ 381,343 6.67% 
The data supplied by the CHP C-TIPs Northern 
California Division indicate a wide variance in the 
reporting of cargo theft between 1998 and 1999. In 1998, 
the reported cargo theft dollar figure total is $ 40, 
418,169.05 with high technology thefts (computers and other 
high tech electronics products) accounting for 
$23,121,713.96 or 25.15% of all reported thefts. In 1999, 
the total reported cargo thefts dropped to $8,647,961 with 
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 high technology component theft reported at $3,058,092.18, 
of 54.29 % of all reported thefts. The CHP admits that the 
drop in cargo crime between 1998 and 1999 is solely on 
paper and does not reflect the reality of the cargo theft 
situation, only a glaring problem with both theft reporting 
and redording procedures (Leonard, 2000). . 
The FBI Cargo Theft task force was organized in 1996 
and was formed in response to the FBI's awareness of 
increased cargo theft problems in the U.S. and was 
specifically designed to address the dilemma of high 
technology product theft via the FBI Cargo/High Technology 
Initiative (FBI, 2000). This initiative sought to expand 
the FBI role and leadership in attacking the cargo theft 
problem, w:lile the FBI Cargo Theft Task Force was formed in 
1996, the only statistical data available on cargo theft 
losses covers the 1999 and 2000 (January 1 - September 5) 
period in the San Francisco Bay area and in Southern 
California. These data are presented in Table 7. 
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 Table 7. Federal Bureau of Investigation: Cargo 
Theft Task Force Reported Losses 
(Losses Reported in Millions) 
San FrancisCO Area Total Losses High Tech Losses % 
'99 $ 4,611,199 $ 3,880,199 84.0% 
2000* $ 519,812 $ 169,812 32.7% 
Southern California Area 
'99 $ 41,565,000 $ 11,995,000 28.86% 
2000* $16,250,000 $ 3,000,000 18.46% 
*January I through September 5, 2000 
Examination of the data above once again reveals a 
wide varianee between 1999 and 2000 reported thefts both in 
the San Francisco Bay area and in Southern California. 
Table 7 shows that during 1999 the San Francisco Bay area 
had $4,611,199 in reported losses with $3,880,199 (84%) of 
the losses being high technology. In the first eight months 
of 2000, reported losses dropped to only $519,812, with 
$169,812 (32.7%) being attributed to high technology. 
Examination of Southern California reported cargo theft 
losses in 1999 show that $41,565,000 in total losses were 
reported, of which $11,995,000 (28.86%) involved high 
technology product theft. The Southern California reported 
cargo theft total for January 1 ^ September 5, 2000, 
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dropped to $16,250,000 of which $3,000,000 (18.46%) was 
related to high technology product theft. These theft 
totals belie what the true cargo theft figures are believed 
to be, as the FBI has publicly stated that they estimate 
the total yearly cargo theft losses in Southern California 
alone to currently total $360 million per year, much of 
which is attributed to high technology theft (Millar, 
2000). 
Why the Numbers Lie - What 
the Numbers Hide 
Examination of the above data supports the contention 
that there exists a wide variance between reported cargo 
thefts and the true amount of theft/ which knowledgeable 
law enforcement and private industry sources contend is 
occurring (McLaughlin,2001). While the ubiquitous problem 
of under reporting and non-reporting can be cited as a 
major contributing factor to the currently available 
unreliable data, an additional factor is that no one 
reliable state-wide, let alone national data base on cargo 
theft exists, and there are only a few statutes in 
existence that specifically address cargo theft reporting. 
Most law enforcement agencies do not code crimes according 
to whether cargo theft may have been involved, therefore 
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crimes invoIving the theft of cargo may be 
reported/recorded as vehicle thefts (in the case of stolen 
trailer loads of high technology product) or simply as 
grand theft burglary from motor vehicles, without ever 
being recorded as "cargo thefts." Pate (1996) reports that 
an anonymous FBI source has pointed out that at least 18 
Uniform crime Report categories could involve cargo theft, 
ranging from homicide, kidnapping to grand theft, yet no 
specific data recording cargo theft exists. This current 
situation virtually insures that a chasm will remain 
between th number of "reported" cargo theft losses, and 
the actual losses and circumstances under which they occur, 
Thus, the lack of any reliable reporting system and data , 
base allow a multibillion dollar criminal enterprise to 
flourish nationally. 
Legislative Efforts 
Currently, only two states have any official cargo 
theft-specific legislation in effect. These are the States 
of New Jersey (APPENDIX A- STATE OF NEW JERSEY, MEMORANDUM, 
JANUARY 5, 1998- DIRECTIVE CONCERNING MANDATORY CARGO THEFT 
AND HTJACKING REPORTING) and Massachusetts (APPENDIX B-
M.G.L. CHAPTER 266, SECTION 2OB, GENERAL LAWS OF 
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MASSACHUSETTS & APPENDIX C- M.G.L. CHAPTER 255, SECTION 
2OA, GENERAL LAWS OF MASSACHUSETTS). In 1:993, the State of 
New Jersey instituted a voluntary cargo theft reporting 
program in which all municipal, county and state law 
enforcement agencies were requested to report cargo thefts 
occurring mithin their jurisdictions to the New Jersey 
State Police Cargo, Theft and Robbery Unit in order to 
signif-icantly improve statewide law enforcement 
intelligence on cargo theft activity (Attorney General, 
State of New Jersey, 1998). Unfortunately, by 1998 it was 
recognized that participation in this voluntary program was 
not anywhere near:uniform across the state. Therefore, the 
Attorney General Of the State of New Jersey issued a 
directive on January 5, 1998, instructing all municipal, 
county and state law enforcement agencies to comply with 
mandatory reporting guidelines on reporting cargo thefts 
within 24 hours of the initiation of investigatory 
activity. While this effort was quite laudable, the New 
Jersey State Police Cargo Theft and Robbery Unit presently 
estimates that less than 10% of all law enforcement 
agencies in that state are in compliance with the directive 
(Salzmann, 2000). 
49 
 Moreover, it is reported that due to understaffing and 
the lack of a full-time analyst and a suitable computer 
system, that the accuracy of cargo theft data is 
questionable due to it's being heavily understated. This 
situation is compounded by the fact that first time 
offenders in cargo theft cases are rarely sentenced to 
prison (Salzmann, 2000), thus the lack of any effective 
punishment for the crime in question encourages cargo theft 
activity. 
The State of Massachusetts has enacted two laws 
specific to cargo theft. Massachusetts State Law Chapter 
266, Section 2OA (APPENDIX B) provides for a penalty of 
imprisonmeiit for riot more than ten years or a fine of not 
more than $500 and imprisonment of not more than two years 
for breaking and entering a truck with the intent to commit 
a felony. Massachusetts State Law Chapter 255 Section 20B 
(APPENDIX C) provides for punishment of imprisonment for 
not more than five years or a fine of not more than $500 
and imprisonment of not more than two years for the theft 
of a truck, tractor/trailer unit, semi-trailer or freight 
container. 
In terms of federal legislation, the FBI states that 
there are nine federal statutes that can be applied to the 
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prosecution of car(^o theft/high technology product theft 
(Millar, 200Q). These statutes (APPENDIX D- FEDERAL 
STATUTES UTILIZED IN PROSECUTION OF CARGO/HIGH TECHNOLOGY 
PRODUCT THEFT) cover a wide range of issues such as 
interstate transportation of stolen goods, wire fraud, 
conspiracy money laundering, interstate transportation in 
aid of racketeering, and the RICO Act. Realistically, 
however, in obtaining federal prosecution for cargo theft-
related crimes, certain monetary "thresholds" many times 
must be me: before! the FBI or the Department of Justice 
will inter rene (Millar, 2000). In geographic areas of high 
incidences of cargo theft, such as Southern California, 
these "thresholds'* as they are known, may approach one 
million doliars iri any given case and normally involve 
large organized conspiracies. Obviously, this pares down 
the number of cases that federal authorities will become 
involved in, leaving investigatory activity and prosecution 
to local 1aw enforcement and the courts. 
Federal Versus Local Law 
Enforcement Tactics 
Another nuanpe of federal versus local investigation 
and prosecution of cargo theft cases and cited by Pate 
(1996) involves tjactical and investigative methodology 
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differences Pate quotes an unpublished FBI report which 
states: 
The^traditional approach has been a reactive 
one, i.el, FBI agents conduct an investigation 
fter a crime has occurred. More recently, the 
FBI has taken a proactive approach to the cargo 
theft problem. 
In this method of investigation, a program is 
designed to analyze a particular criminal 
activity to find ways of controlling it and 
reducing or eliminating it. One technique is the 
undercoyer operation (UCO)... A UCO involves the 
penetration and investigation of groups involved 
in the theft of stolen property. This is 
accomplished by having undercover Agents (UCAs) 
pose as;fences or as other individuals associated 
with thd organized handling and disposal of 
stolen property. The UCAs conduct transactions 
with the thieves and fences in order to 
conduct their investigations, with the goal of 
obtaining prosecutable evidence against the 
targeted subjects (p.11). 
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Pate contends that such undercover operations or 
"stings" have been successful but controversial, citing 
complaints by local law enforcement regarding such 
drawbacks s: 1) they leave perpetrators on the streets for 
lengthy peiiods of time before a final series of multiple 
arrests car be made, allowing additional crimes to be 
committed; 2) they lead to delayed arrests which mean 
delayed credit for making the arrests, the criteria by 
which detectives are evaluated; 3) they sometimes result in 
the FBI taking credit for investigatory activity that was 
actually aIso performed by several local agencies; 4) they 
require large sum^ of "buy money" which many local law 
enforcement agencies do not have at their disposal; 5) they 
may actually cause additional crimes to be committed; and 
6) they many times require that stolen property be 
impounded, evoking the ire of the victims. 
In addition to the drawbacks pointed out by Pate, it 
should also be noted, particularly in the case of the 
Ecuadorian crews that it is virtually impossible to get an 
undercover operative or undercover agent into their group. 
As has been cited previously, many of their members have 
military or police experience and apply the acumen that 
they have developed by stringently checking the backgrounds 
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of all whom they come in contact with during the process of 
performing their criminal activities. 
The Multi^Jurisdictional 
Nature of Cargo Theft 
Yet another obstacle for law enforcement to overcome 
in the successful investigation and prosecution of cargo 
theft cases is that the crimes many times occur across 
city, county, state and even international (in many cases 
of high technology theft) boundaries (Pate, 1996). Per 
Kozak (1995), by its very nature cargo is susceptible to 
theft from its origin to its destination. Cross-country 
cargo flows through a network of truck terminals and large 
regional consolidation centers being unloaded, sorted, and 
reloaded several times along the way. Theft of part of the 
shipment may occur at any point during transportation and 
may not be discovered until the cargo reaches its final 
destination. Therefore, even the seemingly simple act of 
filing a theft report can be made difficult, if not at 
times impossible.iFor example, if a shipment of laptop 
computers originates in Japan, arrives in the U.S. at the 
Port of Lcs Angeles, is transported by one truck to Denver, 
another to Chicago, and then is transported by yet another 
truck to Florida, where half of the shipment is found to be 
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missing at 'iestination, pinpointing where the theft 
actually ocsurred may prove impossible. Law enforcement is 
many times reluctant at best to take a theft report on an 
incident of theft that cannot be proven to have taken place 
within their own particular jurisdiction. Hence, 
investigation and prosecution are thwarted. 
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 CHAPTER FOUR 
FINDINGS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND 
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
Introduction 
The prseeding sections of this study have shown that 
cargo theft, particularly high technology product cargo 
theft, is occurring nationwide on a vast, scale and that law 
enforcement faces multiple problems in combating this 
activity, including formidable opponents in the organized 
groups of cargo thieves, as well as serious challenges in 
terms of a lack of funding, understaffing, a dearth of data 
on which to build strategy, and a lack of specialized 
legislatio1 regarding the problem. Based on the information 
available, the following findings and corresponding 
recommendations have been developed in the interest of 
establishing a viable matrix of resources to utilize in 
combating this form of crime. 
The first finding is that law enforcement to date has 
not been a.dequately prepared to combat cargo theft. Law 
enforcement nationwide has been slow in recognizing that 
cargo theft, particularly the theft of high technology 
products, is an enormous criminal problem, with not only 
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 national but also international implications. While in the 
last few years some positive developments have occurred, 
specifically in the form of the development of multi-agency 
task forces, these task forces are far too few, and for the 
most part are understaffed and lacking sufficient funding 
to be as effective as they potentially can and should be. 
This situation places law enforcement in the position of 
being an urderdog in battling well organized international 
criminal organizations. These organizations know how to 
manipulate our laws and the legal processes of our 
democratic system of government in order to further their 
criminal activities. They also know law enforcement 
strategies and limitations, and frequently are able to 
commit thefts with a low probability of discovery or 
capture. 
In order to better address the growing problem of 
cargo theft, it is recommended that existing multi-agency 
forces be strengthened and that other multi-agency forces 
be created to address this problem. To date, the only 
successfully proven method of combating the high technology 
and other forms of cargo theft:has been via multi-agency 
forces. These task forces need to be adequately funded. 
utilizing specialized federal funding where necessary, in 
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order that realistic staffing levels can be achieved, 
State-of-the-art equipment is also needed. Many computer 
systems utilized by these units are antiquated, 
Investigators have been known to have to purchase their own 
personal cellular phones for use in the field. 
In addition to the above fiscally related problems, 
one of the major impediments has been a lack of 
communicati.on and cooperation between agencies, 
particularly between municipal/county agencies and federal 
law enforcement agencies. It is therefore recommended that 
federal personnel, at least one FBI agent, be made 
available by the FBI to be assigned to all 
municipal/county/state sponsored anti-cargo theft teams. 
The exist!:ig chasm of communication and cooperation (and 
sometimes out-and-out rivalry) has only allowed criminal 
enterprises to capitalize on the situation and to flourish, 
The second finding of this study is that cargo theft 
has proved to be a complex form of crime to investigate, 
This find!ng is due to several factors including: 
1) The multi-jurisdictional nature of the theft itself 
ard of how, in particular, high technology stolen 
cargo products are distributed nationally and 
internationally. 
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2) Many law enforcement investigators, outside of 
those specially trained in cargo theft, aside from 
not understanding the organized nature and vast 
scope of the crime, sometimes do not even recognize 
what the technological product being stolen is, 
what function it performs, or what it's value is. 
An investigator not conversant with high technology 
products could look at a box full of stolen 
microchips with a value of one-half million dollars 
and not even know what he/she was looking at. 
3) Under reporting and non-reporting by private 
industry of high technology losses impedes law 
forcement response to combating this form ofen 
crime. 
4) The existing communication gap on losses between 
law enforcement and private industry manufacturers 
and cargo carriers hides the scope and nature of 
the crime, therefore law enforcement cannot 
possibly address the problem adequately. 
It is therefore recommended that the multi-
jurisdictional nature of cargo theft mandates an increased 
role be played by the federal government. The role that the 
federal government needs to undertake involves both 
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investigatory functions and the enactment of cargo-theft 
specific legislation (see third recommendation). Thus far, 
for the most part, the FBI has conducted investigations 
that were independent of state and local law enforcement 
cargo theft units. These parallel, but not intersecting 
investigatery efforts need to be combined with the 
intelligence gathering and investigatory efforts of local 
law enforcement so that all law enforcement agencies are 
working in tandem on the problem at hand. 
Law enforcement investigators, both local and federal, 
need expertise and training in the nature of high 
technology cargo theft, and in basic matters such as the 
ability to identify high technology components. It should 
be remembered that much about high technology products is 
new, and that electronic high technology is evolving at a 
rapid pace Law enforcement needs the opportunity to keep 
pace with industry developments. Private industry can and 
should aid law enforcement by offering training/seminars to 
investigators of high technology theft on an ongoing, 
regular basis. This would not only keep investigators 
abreast of new developments, but also keep them in contact 
with the other law enforcement personnel with whom they 
could network and share information. It would also allow 
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investigators to have access to industry professionals who 
could serve as resource persons during investigations. This 
would form a valuable informal information conduit. 
Legislated mandatory reporting of all cargo thefts 
needs to be enacted, much like the reporting of the thefts 
of firearms or prescription narcotics. Private industry 
needs to step forward and close the "communication gap" 
that currently exists between themselves and law 
enforcement. The private industry sponsored establishment 
of regional organizations, such as the Western States Cargo 
Theft Association in Southern California, which brings law 
enforcement personnel and private industry professionals 
together for the goal of information exchange and mutual 
assistance in fighting cargo theft, is essential. Also, 
private industry manufacturing entities need to demonstrate 
a willingness to assist law enforcement in their efforts by 
providing information requested by law enforcement in a 
prompt manner. Currently, it is not unheard of for law 
enforcement requests for the serial numbers of stolen high 
technology products to go unanswered or take low priority 
in providing assistance. The attitude that once something 
is stolen it becomes solely the problem of law enforcement 
is deadly, and only leads to increased future thefts. 
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Private industry sharing of information with law 
enforcement is imperative in building a bond between the 
two entitles. Without such cooperation no successful war on 
high technology cargo theft can be waged. Special interests 
and outright apathy must give way to the solution of the 
larger protlem at hand and the dismantling of the 
multibillicn dollar criminal industry which has evolved 
around the growth of the high technology industry. 
The third finding of this study is that a lack of 
effective punishment for cargo theft-related crimes exists. 
A lack of effective punishment for those convicted of cargo 
theft is a contributing factor to the current high levels 
theft taking place today nationally. The low risk of swift 
prosecution and the light sentences meted out provide 
little disincentive to would-be thieves. Because of this, 
many groups of foreign nationals have come to see high 
technology cargo theft as a highly rewarding enterprise 
with low risk and little down side. 
It is recommended that punishment for cargo thieves 
must be re-visited. Federal and state laws specific to 
cargo theft need to be enacted and the energetic 
prosecution of those involved in cargo theft must be 
initiated. While in 1996, former U.S. Attorney General 
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Janet Reno pledged to reverse federal law enforcement 
inattention to the nationwide problem of cargo theft by 
stating her "commitment to increase federal enforcement 
efforts to combat cargo theft " (Pate, 1996, p.3), no 
dramatic positive effect has been evidenced to date in 
terms of either legislation, or an increase in arrests and 
decrease in thefts occurring, as evidenced by data cited in 
this study-
The most recent attempt to introduce national cargo-
theft specific legislation came in 1998 when Senator Frank 
Lautenberg of New Jersey proposed Senate Bill 1512, which 
provided for national legislation that would increase 
punishment for cargo thieves. At a National Cargo Security 
Conference meeting held in April of that year. Senator 
) 
Lautenberg stated: 
The laws of interstate cargo theft have 
changed little since they were written in 1913-
the year Henry Ford opened his first Model T 
plant, and when goods were mainly being moved by 
horse and wagon. This is why I have introduced 
legislation that would bring the laws up to date 
and make jail terms more likely for the thieves 
(NCSC Cargo Security Report, Summer 1998, p.2). 
63 
The Bi11 could not gain support and was not passed, 
The existing disparity in light sentencing for cargo theft 
crimes as opposed to bank robbery or drug trafficking 
should be ended. Private industry high technology 
manufacturers and cargo carriers should fund political 
action committees to vigorously lobby those in Washington 
D.C., who are in a position to change the existing status 
quo in regard to law on cargo theft. 
The fourth finding of this study is that U.S. 
immigration policies must be reexamined. A mass influx of 
immigration has occurred throughout the United States 
within the last decade. Literally millions of people have 
entered this country legally and illegally from South and 
Central America, Eastern Europe, and Asia, among other 
geographic regions, since the late 1980's. Some of these 
people have entered this country for the sole purpose of 
engaging in organized, professional cargo theft. The nature 
of the int:ernational ties that some immigrants have to 
criminal ojrganizations in their homelands have transformed 
high technlology cargo theft from a largely regional 
criminal emterprise in the late 1980's into what is now a 
global crit,minal network. It is known to law enforcement 
that large quantities of stolen high technology product 
64 
have even bleen transported to adversarial nations such as 
Libya, Iran and Iraq (Millar, 2000). The foreign nationals 
who engage in cargo theft in the United States, upon being 
arrested, either receive light sentences , or no sentences 
at all, and are simply deported, only to return the United 
States and immediately resume engaging in the same criminal 
activity. 
Law enforcement has reported to this researcher during 
the course of conducting interviews for this study that 
many of these criminals show outright contempt for the laws 
of the United States and have laughed about the lack of 
severity of punishment. As one Asian cargo thief in custody 
told a detective, nothing fhat a court in the United States 
could do to him would be anything nearly as bad as the 
conditions he had already endured in his native country, 
and what v,ould happen to him in his native country if he 
were caught stealing. He stated "I like jail better than I 
like Vietnam" (Hogan, 1999). The sentiment of showing 
little fear of law enforcement or the legal system in the 
United States is not uncommon in immigrant cargo thieves. 
In response to the above finding it is recommended 
that the integrity of the borders of the United States 
needs to be restored. While our Statue of Liberty bears at 
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it's base a plaque that reads "give me your tired, your 
poor, your huddled masses, yearning to breath free" 
(Lazarus, The New Colossus, 1903), no where on the plaque 
does it state that the United States is under obligation to 
accept and harbor professional criminals. With this in 
mind, in addition to the enactment of cargo theft-specific 
laws providing for the realistic punishment of those 
convicted 6f cargo theft, it needs to be insured that once 
convicted. criminals serve their full sentences before they 
are deported to their native countries. Organized foreign 
criminal organizations are causing significant harm to the 
American economic engine via multibillion dollar high 
technology cargo theft. Secondly, anyone with any suspected 
criminal background or ties to a criminal organization 
should be refused entry into the United States. This policy 
should not be directed toward any one ethnic group or 
nationality, but rather applied equally to all who seek 
entry into the United States. Admittedly, the problems 
associated with this recommendation are far beyond the 
scope of this study. Suffice it to state that current 
immigration policies and procedures have only enhanced the 
formation of organized criminal groups engaging in cargo 
theft in the United States. 
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 Lastly/, and arguable most importantly, the fifth and 
final finding of this study is that a national repository 
for cargo theft data needs to be established. As this 
study has pointed out, not since 1980 has the federal 
government attempted to gauge the true cost of the 
nationwide criminal enterprise of cargo theft. Since that 
time, a multibillion dollar organized form of theft has 
come into Bxistence and is currently flourishing in the 
form of high technology product cargo theft. As Ohlhausen 
(1997) points out, if high technology theft continues to 
flourish, the criminal organizations involved will only 
grow larger, stronger and richer. They will increase their 
already fcrmidable ability to develop resources which 
facilitate more crime, such as additional weaponry, 
improved communications and transport logistics systems for 
stolen cairgo, increase bail funds, establish more "safe 
houses" and build funding to support the families of their 
fellow organization members who are in jail. In brief, 
these organizations will continue to strengthen themselves 
and make law enforcement efforts to dismantle these 
organizations even more difficult than it is at the present 
time. 
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It is therefore recominended that for the above cited 
reasons, it is imperative that a national law enforcement 
operated data base on cargo theft be established. While 
private industry and professional organizations such as the 
National Cargo Theft Security Council dnd the American 
Trucking Association have made some useful initial efforts 
to gather information in the form of conferences and 
seminars for the purpose of ascertaining how much theft is 
occurring, any accurate national cargo theft data base 
would be m'3st appropriately managed and operated by federal 
law enforcement for three reasons: Firstly, the validity of 
any information entered into the'system is better insured 
by law enforcement than by private industry. Secondly, the 
competitive nature of private enterprise companies dictates 
that law enforcement become the impartial guardian of what 
will surely contain proprietary information belonging to 
individua]. companies. Thirdly, and perhaps of premier 
importance, a federally maintained data base on cargo theft 
activity would contain the most inclusive compilation of 
data, as all state and local law enforcement agencies 
nationwide could be mandated to report cargo theft data to 
this proposed data base 
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To insure reporting compliance, federal funding of 
state and 1aw local enforcement local projects could be 
made contingent upon satisfactory compliance with this 
program. Of the utmost importance in the establishment of 
such a data base would be the feature that all law 
enforcement agencies would then have the ability to "tap 
into" and share information from one centralized national 
clearinghouse for cargo theft activity information. Due to 
the sophistication of the organized groups engaging in 
cargo theft and the fact that any given cargo theft may 
extend itself though a network spanning several different 
jurisdictions, a centralized information repository is 
essential. It is impossible for any single law enforcement 
agency to track enough cargo theft data to permanently put 
a stop to the criminal activities of any of the major 
organized groups engaged in this activity nationally and 
internaticnally. The establishment of a national data base 
would undoubtedly facilitate inter-agency coordination and 
intelligence sharing. Data analysis performed would allow 
law enforcement to be able to recognize patterns and 
trends, as well as identify particular characteristics of 
the different organized groups in operation, thereby 
enabling law enforcement to develop strategies to act in 
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 much more proactive, rather than reactive manner. For 
example, when a group using the same modus operandi in 
different locations can be identified, highly improved 
inter—agenc:y coordination and cooperation can be effected, 
resulting in more crimes being solved in a manner that 
saves valuable time, effort and resources of law 
enforcement; nationally. A national data base employing 
appropriate^ crime analysis technigues would not only allow 
for ascertaining what the true cost of cargo theft, 
particularly high technology cargo theft in America is, but 
would also allow for the identification of crime pattern 
analysis, dffender characteristics, criminal organization 
structures, case tracking and the discovery of geographic 
and ethnic links between theft crews, fences, and the 
component entities involved in the national and 
internatiolal stolen cargo distribution chains. It could 
also lead to establishing links between cargo theft and 
money laundering, large scale fraud, narcotics sales and 
transportation, and the financing of large national and 
international criminal organizations. 
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Establishing a National Cargo 
Theft Database 
In terms of who would perform the gathering of data 
and maintaining a national cargo theft data base, 
logically^ the U.S. Department of Justice/FBI Uniform Crime 
Report (UCR) would, at first glance, be the most 
appropriate: medixxm to collect information. However, 
according to the U.S. Secretary of Transportation (2000), 
the FBI, which administers the UCR program and the National 
Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS), does not support 
adding a cargo theft offense to the UCR program because the 
program is being phased out and will eventually be replaced 
by NIBRS. Also, the FBI states that a major obstacle to 
creating a cargo theft category in the UCR is establishing 
a comprehensive and widely recognized definition of cargo 
theft. Variations occur in defining similar or the same 
crimes in different states, so it is therefore essential 
that any national data base adopt a single clear definition 
of what COmprises a cargo theft. 
As previously pointed out in this study, there are 
currently 18 different UCR categories under which cargo 
theft may fall. Cargo thefts can occur from trucks, planes. 
trains, warehouses, or manufacturing facilities, be 
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 perpetrated by armed or unarmed thieves, and involve 
violence or kidnapping, as is the case in many truck 
hijackings, To a great extent, these factors dictate how 
the crime is categorized currently under the UCR program. 
Another FBI objection to the utilization of the UCR 
program for reporting cargo thefts is that if cargo theft 
were now to be given a separate UCR category, it would 
dilute almost 70 years of data that has been used for , 
comparison purposes. The FBI also states that utilizing the 
UCR for this purpose would place an undue hardship on the 
present cooperative statistical effort of almost 17,000 
city, county and state law enforcement agencies presently 
voluntarily reporting data on crimes. Instead, the FBI 
recommends the use of the NIBRS system to collect cargo 
theft data The Bureau states that cargo theft data can be 
extracted from NIBRS simply by querying location and/or 
cost analysis as most cargo thefts are of a higher dollar 
value than a typical larceny theft. The FBI further 
maintains that NIBRS allows for more detailed collection of 
crime date,  which would include the location of a specific 
incident. the relationship between victim and offender, and 
a comprehensive description of the property involved in any 
theft. The FBI contends that NIBRS is a more comprehensive 
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and detailed source of information than the data summary of 
the UCR pregram. At the present time, however, only 10% of 
the population of the U.S. is included under the NIBRS 
program, but that percentage will increase over time. 
NIBRS, per the FBI's contention, will permit the 
collection, analysis, and reporting of data on cargo theft 
that will enable law enforcement to assess the extent of 
cargo theft losses and to develop a appropriate responses 
to the problem. At the very least, the NIBRS program is a 
long awaited start in the right direction. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSIONS 
Comments on This Study 
This study has attempted to bring to light the extent; 
of the national criminal problem of cargo theft, 
particularly that of high technology product theft, and to 
describe t'.le "who, what, when, where, how and why" of this 
multibilliDn dollar criminal industry. This study has shown 
that as this problem increased to alarming levels in last 
decade as evidenced by the National Cargo Security Council 
2000 estimate of cargo theft losses reaching 12 billion 
dollars per year, and the 1999 FBI estimate of 7 billion 
dollars in yearly cargo theft losses. The study discusses 
an almost benign neglect of the problem that exists on the 
federal level. 
This neglect is perhaps best exemplified by there 
being no c.ttempt made by the federal government to access 
the true cost of cargo theft losses since 1980, over twenty 
years ago. This study has also pointed out that the "cyber 
revolutioA" of the last decade not only produced a 
burgeoninc technological industry in the form of the high 
technology product manufacturing and distribution system. 
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which adds greatly to fueling the American economic engine. 
but also that a "down side" to this economic boom exists in 
the growth of highly organized criminal groups who 
specialize in the large scale theft of high technology 
products. Law enforcement, to date, unfortunately has been 
shown to be behind the growth curve of the criminal 
industry that has developed, with the only hope to 
successfully combat this crime lying in specialized multi-
jurisdictional teams, which are hampered by being 
understaffed, under funded, and not organized on a national 
level. 
Recommendations provided by this study include the 
funding and training of multi-jurisdictional task forces to 
combat cargo theft nationally, an increased role to be 
played by federal law enforcement, legislation including 
mandatory reporting of cargo theft and effective punishment 
for cargo theft-related crimes, as well as the 
reexamination of U.S. immigration policy as it relates to 
criminals. 
Perhaps most importantly, it is the recommendation as 
well as the fervent hope of this study that a national data 
base for the reporting of cargo crime can be established, 
( 
so that state-of-the-art statistical data analysis can aid 
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law enforcement greatly in combating this crime. A national 
data base v/ould also provide the by-product of a rich 
resource for future researchers in this area of expertise 
for the mining of information and analytical data. This is 
essential in order to further build a body of knowledge on 
this form of crime that can be utilized by law enforcement 
and private industry alike, in the prevention, 
investigation and prosecution of cargo theft, 
As America enters the 21®^ century, our legislators and 
law enforcement officials will hopefully recognize that we 
must utilize to the fullest 21®^ century methods, tactics, 
and strategies in waging a war on the multibillion dollar 
criminal industry of cargo theft in the United States of 
America. 
Limitations of This Study 
This study was undertaken with full knowledge of the 
impediments that exist in attempting to present a 
meaningful picture of the problem of cargo theft in 
America. Difficulties included the collection of diverse 
data on the cargo theft problem from many sources. As the 
Study states, at this point in time no national data base 
on cargo theft exists. Current data were obtained from law 
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enforcement: sources nationwide, and were often assembled by 
these sources specifically for this study. Data of a 
historical nature is difficult, if not at times impossible. 
to come by While it has been my earnest desire to be 
precise in citing the amount of cargo theft occurring in 
any given area of the U.S. referred to in this study, it 
has not always been possible. 
Another difficulty encountered was the reluctance of 
private industry to release proprietary information on 
cargo thefts sustained, for fear of eroding customer 
confidence and the subsequent loss of market Share, 
Unfortunat ly, it is the harboring of these "dirty little 
secrets" on losses that allow cargo theft to flourish, 
Lastly, while much of the information that was 
graciously provided to me by law enforcement can be made 
public, some information and details could not be stated in 
this study due to the sensitive role that they play in 
current ongoing investigations. I have sincerely attempted 
to provide a valuabie insight into the nebulous world of 
cargo theft, while: at the same time respecting the need for 
confidentiality required by law enforcement on some facets 
of cargo theft investigation. 
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APPENDIX A: 
STATE OF NEW JERSEY^ 
MEMORANDUM, JANUARY 5, 1998-
DlRECTiyE. CONCERNTNG MANDATORY.. 
CARGO THEFT AND HIJACKING 
REPORTING 
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ifi af Serseg 
Department of Law and Pubuc Saf^ 
Office OF the Attorn^ General 
GHRis-nNE Tooo Whi-
Coyernqr 
. CNOSO,:,' 
TfitNTON, NJ ^ 625-OOflO 
(609)292^925 \; 
Peter.Ver.niERG 
/Mtorney General 
ORANDUM 
Paul H.Zoubek :TO: 
Director, Division ofCrirninal Justice 
All Couniy Prosecutors 
Peter Vemiero 
Attorney General 
DATE: Januarys,1998 
FROM: 
SUBJECT: DireeUye Coftcerning Mandatory Cargo Tbeft and Hijacking
.Reporting . 
Iisn-RODUCTION 
The New Jersey State Police Cargo Theft/RpbBery Unit wa& 
established on June 1. 1992: (1} to assistlaw enforcement agencies with the investigation ofcargothefts^d rog,cne , 
t2Vtd idehtifv areas where cargo theft is a recurrent problem;and,(3)to 
SnduJ l..dtag to ar.=st., pros.™tion and r„6veo'•» 
Stolen property. 
The success ofour statewide effoit to combatcargo theft^^^ 
robbery depends upon the receipt oftimely and accurate information from all 
law enfoircement agencies. 
"Since 1993,asystem ofvoluntaryTeporting has been in place ^ 
which has significantly improved statewide intelligence conceming car^ . 
robberiICS and hijacking. However,,because participation m the program . 
not bee:n uniform across the State,the database developed to date is not as 
comple:e as it could be. 
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DIRECT!f/E 
i. Effective immediately,any agency that investigates a caxgo 
theft,robbcQ^of hijacking or recovers stQlen cargo is required to notify the 
State Police Cargo Theft/Robbery Unit within 24 hours by corapleting the 
theft/hijaGking rnessage(Pile 16)which is part ofthe Crimihal Justice 
Informatioii System. TTje message will then be routed to a preselected
destinaticjn terininal at the New Jersey State Police Cargo Theft/Robbery Unit 
through t!le New Jersey Law EnforcementTelecommunications System. 
2, This Directiye applies to all thefts, robberies or hijackings of 
cargo frohji (a) Storage facilities; (b) Commercial and industrial centers; (c) Air, 
sea and n■ail terminals; and, (d) Commercial freight carriers. 
CONGLUSION 
By maintaining a record of cargo theft, robbery and hijackings, the 
New Jersey State Police, Cargo Theft/Robbery Unit vrill be able to expedite the 
identification of suspected stolen property, identify areas where these crimes 
arc prevalent and analyze trends in cargo thefts. Further analjrtical studies will 
identify individuals and organized groups involved in cargo thefts which will 
enhance cargo theft investigations statewide. 
If you have any questions concerning this Directive, please contact 
Lt. Joseph Rogalski of the New Jersey State Police Cargo Theft/Robbery Unit at 
732-548-7iS3. -, : ; : ■, : 
Thank you iri advaiicc for your attention to this matter. 
Peter Vemiero ■ 
Attorney General 
PV:mp 
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APPENDIX B: 
GENERAL LAWS OF 
MASSACHUSETTS 
CHAPTER 266: 
SECTION 2OA. 
BREAKING AND ENTERING 
OF TRUCKS, TRACTORS, 
TRAILERS OR 
FREIGHT CONTAINERS 
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  
M.G.L.- Chapter 266,Section 
GE]^^ERALI^WSOF 
Chapter266:Section 20A.Breaking and entering oftriicks,tractors,trailers orfreight 
containers* ® 
Section20A.\^oever breaks and enters,or enters without breaking,atruck,tractor/trailer unit 
trail^,semi-tr^er orfi-ejght container with intent to coramita felony,shall be punished by
m^sonnientin the state prison for not morethan ten yearsor by a fine ofnot morethanfive hundred 
dollars and impnsonmentin the house ofcorrectionfbrnot morethantwo years. 
Return to; 
geitSection ** Cliantcr 2<;(> TaWepf Cfintertts 
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APPENDIX C: 
GENERAL LAWS OF 
lyASSACHUSETTS 
CHAPTER 266: 
SECTION 2OB. 
STEALING OF TRUCKS, 
TRACTORS, TRAILERS OR 
FREIGHT CONTAINERS 
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 MG.L-Clapter266,Section zon 
vGEffiRiO.LAWS;OFM 
Chattel 3;^:Section 20E.Stealmg in trucksy tractors^ trailers orfreight cqatainers. 
Section 20B. Whoever steals in atruck,tractor/trailer unit,trailer,semi-traaer orfreight container 
shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prisonfor not morethan five years or by a fine ofnot 
morethan five hundred dollars or by imprisonmentinjaJl for not more than two years. 
Return to: 
' ** Ctvyjitcr 2/^6 T;iW^ ** Le^^dative HomePa^e 
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APPENDIX D: 
FEDERAL STATUTES UTILIZED 
IN PROSECUTION OF CARGO/HIGH 
TECHNOLOGY PRODUCT THEFT 
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 FEDERALSTATUTES UTILIZED IN PROSECUTION OF 
CARGO/HIGH TECHNOLGYPRODUCTTHEFT 
Interstate Transportation ofStolen Property/Sale ofReceipt ofStolen Goods, 
Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 2314i 2315; 
2. Theftfrom Interstate Shipments, Title 18, U.S.C.,Section1659; 
3. Bills ofLading Act, Title 49,U.S.C.j Section 121; ; 
4. Wire Fraud, Title 18, U.S.C., Section 1343; 
5. Conspiracy, Title 18, U.S.C., Section 371; 
6. MoneyLaundering,Title 18, U.S.e., Sections 1956, 1957; 
7. Interstate Transportation in Aid of Racketeering(ITAR),l^itle 18,0.S.C., 
Section 1952; ^ 
8. Racketeering influenced and Gorrjpt Organization Act(RliCO), Title 18,U.S.C., 
Section 1962; 
«v 
9; Hobbs Act Robbery, Title 18, U.S.C,,Section 1951. 
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